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Abstract
In two studies on mobile phone purchase decisions, we investigated consumers’ decision strategies with a newly
developed process tracing tool called InterActive Process Tracing (IAPT). This tool is a combination of several process
tracing techniques (Active Information Search, Mouselab, and retrospective verbal protocol). After repeatedly choosing
one of four mobile phones, participants formalized their strategy so that it could be used to make choices for them.
The choices made by the identified strategies correctly predicted the observed choices in 73% (Experiment 1) and 67%
(Experiment 2) of the cases. Moreover, in Experiment 2 we directly compared Mouselab and eye tracking with respect
to their impact on information search and strategy description. We found only minor differences between these two
methods. We conclude that IAPT is a useful research tool to identify choice strategies, and that using eye tracking
technology did not increase its validity beyond that gained with Mouselab.
Keywords: decision strategies, process tracing, verbal protocols, decision making, eye tracking, Mouselab.
1 Introduction
Identifying the processes that underlie judgment and de-
cision making has been of great interest to researchers
for several decades already. In this context, two major
paradigms have been used: structural modeling and pro-
cess tracing (Abelson & Levi, 1985; Billings & Marcus,
1983; Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979; Ford,
Schmitt, Schlechtman, Hults, & Doherty, 1989; Harte &
Koele, 1995; Payne, 1976; Svenson, 1979). Structural
modeling aims to uncover psychological processes by re-
lating the provided information to the decisions or judg-
ments, typically via multiple linear regression analysis.
The parameters in these models are thought to represent
important features of participants’ decision strategies, for
instance, if a particular attribute receives a high weight
in a regression equation it is interpreted as being very
important for the decision maker. Despite its popularity,
this approach has been criticized for ignoring the prede-
cisional phase, that is, the processes that take place be-
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tween stimulus presentation and final decision. For ex-
ample, Svenson (1979) concluded that it is “gradually
becoming clear that human decision making cannot be
understood simply by studying final decisions” (p. 86)
and, similarly, Payne, Braunstein, and Carroll (1978) ar-
gued that the “input-output analyses that have been used
in most decision research are not fully adequate to de-
velop and test process models of decision behavior” (p.
19). As a response to these and other objections against
structural modeling (for an overview, see Bröder, 2000),
Payne (1976) and others developed the process tracing
approach by adapting methods from research on human
problem solving (Newell & Simon, 1972). As opposed
to structural modeling, the aim of process tracing is to di-
rectly describe the processes taking place during the pre-
decisional phase. To achieve this, the participants’ infor-
mation search and integration is closely observed while
they work on the decision task. Frequently used methods
within this paradigm are information boards (e.g., Payne,
1976; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993), verbal pro-
tocols (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1984), the recording of
eye movements (e.g., Lohse & Johnson, 1996; Russo &
Leclerc, 1994; Russo & Rosen, 1975), and the method of
Active Information Search (AIS; Huber, Wider, & Huber,
1997).
In the following, we briefly describe these process trac-
ing methodologies and discuss their strengths and weak-
nesses. We then present a new tool called InterActive
Process Tracing (IAPT), which we developed to iden-
tify the decision processes underlying preferential choice.
1
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Table 1: Strengths and weaknesses of four process tracing techniques.
Strengths Weaknesses
Mouselab
+ Convenient to use.
+ A large amount of data: which and how much infor-
mation is retrieved and the sequence of the information
acquisition.
– Overly structured: participant may be influenced as
to what information to use or to consider important.
– Only data concerning the search for information, but
no data concerning information integration.
Eye Tracking
+ A large amount of data: which and how much infor-
mation is retrieved and the sequence of the information
acquisition.
+ Very fast and effortless information acquisition.
+ Mostly nonreactive: behavior cannot easily be cen-
sored by the participants.
+ Better suited than Mouselab to problems with more
complex information displays.
– Expensive equipment.
– A reliable calibration cannot be achieved for all par-
ticipants.
– Overly structured: participant may be influenced as
to what information to use or to consider important.
– Only data concerning the search for information, but
no data concerning information integration.
Active Information Search (AIS)
+ Enhanced realism: participants are less affected by
the experimental setup.
– Less exact monitoring of the information acquisition
process than with Mouselab.
– Only data concerning the search for information, but
no data concerning information integration.
Retrospective Verbal Protocol
+ Rich and detailed information: information search
and integration.
+ No interference with decision making when partici-
pants work on the task.
– Doubts that people can introspectively access their
cognitive processes.
– Reactivity: forgetting and fabrication.
– Extremely time-consuming analysis.
IAPT uses various elements of the process tracing mea-
sures mentioned above to combine their strengths and si-
multaneously overcome some of their weaknesses. We
subsequently describe two experiments in which we suc-
cessfully applied IAPT to identify participants’ decision
strategies. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of our
findings and outline avenues for future research.
1.1 Process tracing techniques
1.1.1 Information search: Mouselab, eye tracking,
and the method of Active Information Search
A range of techniques has been developed within the pro-
cess tracing paradigm, each of them having both strengths
and weaknesses (see Table 1). A popular method is
Mouselab (Payne et al., 1993), the computerized ver-
sion of the information board (Payne, 1976). In a typ-
ical Mouselab-based study, participants have the oppor-
tunity to acquire information about the choice alterna-
tives by using the computer mouse to click on, or move a
pointer over, the cells of an attributes-by-alternatives ma-
trix. Mouselab provides data concerning the information
acquisition phase, such as which cells are looked up, in
which order, and how much time was spent looking at
each cell. Besides being relatively easy to use for experi-
menters, this method is also quite convenient for partici-
pants because they are confronted with a relatively well-
structured decision situation in which all the available in-
formation is clearly arranged.
Another, and in this context very similar, way to trace
the participants’ information search is to record their eye
movements. Instead of using a computer mouse to obtain
information, here participants simply have to look at a
screen where the information is displayed. The eye track-
ing equipment records which information is fixated and
so produces data that are similar to Mouselab’s. How-
ever, for eye tracking, the process of information acquisi-
tion resembles more a natural situation (simple reading)
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as compared to Mouselab (opening cells).
Similar to Mouselab and eye tracking, the method
of Active Information Search (Huber, Wider, & Huber,
1977) is aimed at discovering the information that is ac-
tually requested by the decision maker. In contrast to
studies using Mouselab, however, the decision task in
a typical AIS study is presented with as little structure
as possible. In this manner, participants can build up a
cognitive representation of the task that is virtually unaf-
fected by the experimental setup (Brucks, 1988; Huber et
al., 1977). Specifically, the participants receive a minimal
description of the decision situation and have to query the
experimenter for any further information.
A major weakness of the information search tech-
niques is that they provide no direct data about how par-
ticipants integrate the obtained information (for other re-
active effects of information boards, see Arch, Bettman,
& Pakkar, 1978). Although it is commonly assumed that
characteristics of the evaluation process can be deduced
from the way in which participants search for informa-
tion (e.g., Harte & Koele, 2001), it is not entirely clear
exactly how information search and information integra-
tion are related to each other (for a critical position, see
Bröder, 2000; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008).
1.1.2 Information integration: Retrospective verbal
protocol
One way to gain more explicit insight into the process-
ing of the obtained information is to collect verbal proto-
cols, which can be done in two different ways. Concur-
rent verbal protocols are collected while the participant
works on the task, whereas retrospective verbal protocols
are collected only after task completion. In both variants,
the participants are asked to “think aloud,” that is, to tell
the experimenter everything that comes or came to their
minds when working on the task. Typically, these ver-
balizations are recorded and subsequently coded by the
experimenter.
Although intuitively appealing, serious concerns have
been raised regarding the use of verbal protocols in gen-
eral and retrospective protocols in particular. In a clas-
sic paper, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) questioned the as-
sumption that people have introspective access to their
cognitive processes and concluded that people’s ability
to observe and report upon higher order mental opera-
tions is often small or even not existent. Ericsson and Si-
mon (1984) challenged this conclusion and claimed that
“better methods for probing for that awareness (concur-
rent or immediate retrospective reports) would yield con-
siderable insight into the cognitive processes occurring
in most of the studies discussed by Nisbett and Wilson”
(p. 29, italics in the original). However, they point out
that retrospective verbal protocols should be collected
immediately after task completion and that the general
instruction should be “to report everything you can re-
member about your thoughts during the last problem” (p.
19). When these conditions are met then retrospective
verbal reports can be powerful means for studying cogni-
tive processes. In contrast, Russo, Johnson, and Stephens
(1989) have a more negative view on verbal protocols.
They argue that in concurrent protocols the instruction
to think aloud may interfere with the task the participant
is working on, which can alter the accuracy of the re-
sponse. Even worse, these authors found significant re-
activity when collecting verbal protocols retrospectively.
This reactivity was manifested in errors of omission (for-
getting), that is, the participants could not recall the pro-
cesses they used, and errors of commission (fabrication),
that is, they reported processes that did not actually hap-
pen. Russo et al. (1989) conclude that retrospective pro-
tocols should be dismissed as nonveridical.
In our view, the position taken by Russo et al. (1989)
is overly pessimistic, especially given that the problems
associated with retrospective protocols are not without
remedies. First, the problem of forgetting can be effec-
tively diminished when cues are provided that facilitate
the participants’ recall during the collection of the ret-
rospective protocol.1 Such a procedure has been shown
to increase the completeness of the verbal protocol (see
Gog, Paas, Merriënboer, & Witte, 2005, for an overview).
Second, to verify whether fabrication really occurred and
whether the verbal protocols do or do not accurately de-
scribe participants’ decision processes, one can compare
the protocols to some behavioral data. If, for example, the
protocol data are used to formulate an algorithm that can
replicate the decisions made by the participants then this
provides considerable evidence for the validity of such
protocols.
1.1.3 InterActive Process Tracing (IAPT)
Given that each of the four process tracing techniques de-
scribed above has weaknesses and limitations, we devel-
oped a new method that uses and combines features of
these methods, thereby overcoming some of their down-
sides. As pointed out by various authors, multimethod
approaches are a particularly useful way to trace decision
behavior (e.g., Einhorn et al., 1979; Harte & Koele, 2001;
Payne, 1976; Payne et al., 1978; Riedl et al., 2008; Russo,
1978).
A major feature of our method is that an attempt is
made to detect the cognitive processes interactively with
the participant, which is why we call it InterActive Pro-
cess Tracing. In the experiments, participants first se-
1Interestingly, Russo et al. (1989) were one of the first to use this
method but they did not observe the positive effects found in other stud-
ies.
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lected the attributes they considered important (AIS),
then they made a series of choices (Mouselab in Experi-
ments 1 and 2, eye tracking in Experiment 2), and finally,
they were interviewed about their choice strategies. Note,
however, that the last phase of our method deviates from
the conditions specified by Ericsson and Simon (1984)
in that participants were not asked to report a stream of
thought but rather to construct, in retrospect, a precise
process model that resembles their own decision strategy
as closely as possible. We are aware that these changes in
the procedure might reduce the validity of the verbal pro-
tocols. However, the described strategies can be used to
retrospectively predict2 the choices actually made by the
participants. The degree of correspondence between the
actual choices and the predictions of the described strate-
gies can then be used as a measure of the validity of the
described strategies.
1.1.4 Approaches similar to IAPT
Similar procedures have been used by other authors in
various contexts (e.g., Bettman, 1970; Einhorn et al.,
1979; Larcker & Lessig, 1983; Li, Shue, & Shiue, 2000).
Bettman (1970), for example, obtained concurrent ver-
bal protocols from five housewives who were encouraged
to think aloud while shopping. Based on these proto-
cols, he then developed a computational model and sub-
sequently tested whether this model could replicate the
decisions made by the participants reasonably well. He
found that the predictions were highly accurate. In an-
other study, Larcker and Lessig (1983) asked participants
to evaluate the stocks of 50 actual companies with respect
to possible purchase. Immediately after the evaluation,
participants provided a verbal report of their procedure
and developed diagrammatic representations of the man-
ner in which they made their judgment (with the assis-
tance of the researcher). In addition, a linear model was
estimated. The retrospective process tracing models pre-
dicted the participants’ actual choices correctly in 84.4%
of the cases (chance was 50%), which was even higher
than the percentage of correct predictions made by the
linear model (73%). Finally, Einhorn et al. (1979) and Li
et al. (2000) used concurrent verbal protocols to construct
a model that was subsequently validated by comparing
its predictions to the decisions made by the participants.
Again, the models predicted the decisions quite well.
In the two experiments described below, we used our
new method of IAPT to address the question of whether
people are indeed able to gain introspective access to their
cognitive processes, and ultimately, to what extent those
2Note that because the strategies were calculated only after the par-
ticipants’ choices, the correct term in this context would be postdiction
rather than prediction. However, in the following we still use prediction
because it is the more standard terminology.
verbal protocol data are instrumental in constructing pro-
cess models that can accurately predict their choices. In
addition, we were interested in the convergent validity of
the information search techniques and the verbal proto-
col.
2 Experiment 1
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
Participants were 37 students (8 female and 29 male) of
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology of Lausanne
(EPFL) with a mean age of 23.8 years (SD = 2.6 years).
2.1.2 Task
In each of 30 choice trials, participants selected one of
four mobile phones for hypothetical purchase. The stim-
uli were mobile phones because university students gen-
erally have both interest in and some knowledge about
this product category. The phones were real phones sold
in the USA in January 2006 and were drawn randomly
from a pool of 50 in each trial, with the only restric-
tion being that no phone appeared twice in the same trial.
Each participant received exactly the same set of stim-
uli. To avoid biases due to previously established prefer-
ences and to force participants to collect relevant infor-
mation from the information board rather than from their
own memory, phone brand and model name were not dis-
played.
2.1.3 Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
groups. In the without-list condition, participants were
asked to select the attributes on which they wanted infor-
mation, without any further help from the experimenter.
This was meant to enhance the realism of the decision
situation. In the with-list condition, participants also first
freely selected attributes but were then presented with a
list containing all of the 33 available attributes. From this
list they could choose any number of further attributes
that had not occurred to them spontaneously.
2.1.4 Procedure
The experiment consisted of three phases: an attribute
selection phase, an information acquisition and choice
phase, and finally, a strategy identification phase. The
participants completed the first two phases in a total of
approximately 30 minutes and the last in approximately
25 minutes.
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Figure 1: Screen-shot of the computer-based process-tracing measure used in Experiment 1 (after 12 cells had been
clicked on).
Phase 1: Selection of Attributes. Participants were
asked to state the attributes they were interested in and the
experimenter entered them into the computer program.
If participants had a clear idea of what they wanted but
did not know the exact name of the attribute then the ex-
perimenter provided some assistance while trying not to
influence the participant in any way regarding the selec-
tion of attributes. Whenever an attribute did not exist as
specified by the participants (e.g., the attribute “usabil-
ity”, which was not in the set of available attributes due
to its high degree of subjectivity), they were informed that
this information was not available.
After the participants in both conditions had completed
the selection of the attributes — their final set of attributes
is henceforth referred to as the selected attributes — they
ranked these attributes with respect to their importance.
They were informed that in the next phase the attribute
they considered most important would appear on the top
and the one they considered least important on the bot-
tom of the information board. Moreover, participants in
both conditions were informed that, once this ranking was
complete, they could not access any information other
than that concerning the selected attributes.
Phase 2: Information Acquisition and Choices. In this
phase, the information on the selected attributes was pre-
sented in an attributes-by-alternatives matrix (see Figure
1), similar to the display used in the Mouselab procedure.
The information could be obtained by using the com-
puter mouse to click in the appropriate cells. Once a cell
had been clicked on, the information contained within it
remained visible throughout the remainder of the trial.3
There were no constraints regarding the amount of or the
order in which the information was considered. Partic-
ipants could make a choice at any time during a given
trial and could proceed to the next trial only after having
selected one of the options. They could not go back to
earlier trials.
Phase 3: Strategy Identification. In Phase 3, the par-
ticipant and the experimenter interacted closely to gain
an exact description of the participant’s strategy. Specif-
ically, the participants were asked to explain and formal-
ize their strategy in an exact enough manner so that it was
possible to create an algorithm which could stand in for
the decision maker in future choice situations.4 For in-
stance, when participants wanted to eliminate “too expen-
sive” alternatives the experimenter asked them to define
precise cut-offs. Similarly, when the strategy required de-
cisions based on subjective attributes such as design, the
participants were asked to assign values to the alterna-
tives for these attributes. Finally, when the strategy de-
manded the calculation of ratios or overall values, par-
ticipants were asked to assign weights to the attributes.
To reduce biases due to forgetting, we presented screen-
shots of the information board of five of the trials. These
screen-shots were taken when the participants had made
3Note that this is different from the standard form of Mouselab,
where the cells close as soon as the mouse is moved away. We think
that this form is easier to use for participants and, for the current pur-
pose, we found no reason to adhere to the standard procedure.
4Because Levene’s test for the equality of variances proved signifi-
cant, we adjusted the degrees of freedom accordingly.
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Table 2: Participants’ Strategies: Three Examples. Participant 5 used a purely additive strategy, the strategy of partic-
ipant 37 was exclusively based on elimination, and participant 32 combined the two features.
Participant 5: 1) Look at the following attributes: Video clip playback with sound, FM stereo, Speech
recording, Integrated speakerphone, VibraCall, Voice command, MMS, SMS, and Email support. Take the
phone that possesses the greatest number of these attributes.
2) If there is a tie, choose one of the tied phones at random.
Participant 32: 1) Eliminate all phones that do not have SMS and whose standby time is less than 300 hours.
2) If the standby time of all phones is less than 300, choose the phone with the highest standby time.
3) Otherwise, assign the following attribute weights: VibraCall = 3, GPRS = 2, and Bluetooth = 1. For each
attribute that the phone possesses, assign a value of 4. Multiply attribute value with attribute weight and
choose the phone that has the highest score.
4) If there is a tie, choose the phone with the highest standby time.
Participant 37: 1) Eliminate all phones that do not have SMS and VibraCall. Select the cheapest phone.
2) If two or more products are equal in price, choose the smallest phone.
a choice (a procedure known as cued retrospective report-
ing; Gog et al., 2005). We selected these cuing trials, that
were different for each participant, by first dividing the 30
trials into five equal segments and then randomly select-
ing one trial in each segment, excluding the very first trial.
While proceeding through these cuing trials, the partici-
pants had to specify for some attributes how the values
of the alternatives map onto specific values that could be
used more easily within his or her strategy. To give an ex-
ample, for the color attribute, the value “blue” might be
assigned a value of 10, the value “black” a value of 5 and
so on, depending on the participant’s preferences. The
experimenter was careful not to influence the participant
in any way when assisting with the formulation of the
strategy. This phase was completed once a strategy had
been (a) described by the participant, (b) formalized and
written down by the experimenter, and (c) verified by the
participant. The outcome of this procedure will hence-
forth be referred to as a participant’s described strategy.
2.1.5 Payment
To enhance participants’ motivation to carefully describe
and formalize the strategies they used (cf. Hertwig &
Ortmann, 2001), they were informed that their remuner-
ation depended on the number of times their strategies
correctly predicted their choices. They received 1 Swiss
Franc (1 SFR = approximately 0.78 USD at the time the
study was conducted) for each correct prediction, with
a minimum guaranteed amount of 10 SFR. This proce-
dure resulted in an average payment of 22 SFR (SD =
4). Note that, while working on Phases 1 and 2, partici-
pants were not aware that they would be asked to formal-
ize their strategy in Phase 3, or how their payment would
be determined.
2.2 Results
Due to incomplete or faulty transcription of their strate-
gies, six participants were excluded from the analyses,
leaving 16 participants in the without-list condition and
15 in the with-list condition. Overall, participants in-
cluded 5.7 (17%) of the 33 available attributes in the
information board. The attributes that were selected
most often were price (68%), digital camera (55%), size
(52%), and mp3 player (39%) (details regarding the se-
lected attributes available from the authors upon request).
There was no difference between the two conditions (5.13
and 6.33 of 33, respectively; t (19) = 1.49, p = .15).
2.2.1 Described strategies
The strategies were classified according to several dimen-
sions. In general, two types of strategies could be iden-
tified: elimination strategies and additive strategies. The
former eliminate alternatives from the consideration set
based on attribute values, for instance, when a particu-
lar attribute value does not reach the acceptance thresh-
old specified by the participant (for an example, see Ta-
ble 2, participant 37). Thus, they follow a logic similar
to that of lexicographic strategies like the Elimination-
By-Aspects strategy (Tversky, 1972), or that of the take-
the-best heuristic (TTB, Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996;
Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991). The num-
ber of attributes used for elimination varied between one
and nine (M = 3.03, Mdn = 3). About a third of the partic-
ipants (10 of 31) used Just-Noticeable-Differences when
eliminating alternatives (see the Prediction accuracy sec-
tion for further details). Strategies of the second type
add the values (either weighted or not) of all or some at-
tributes for each alternative to determine an overall score
for the alternatives (e.g., Table 2, participant 5).
Of the 31 participants, almost all (30) used elimination
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Figure 2: Percentage of choices correctly predicted by various decision strategies in Experiment 1, with standard
errors. EQW = EQual Weighting, WADD = Weighted ADDitive, TTB = Take-The-Best, JND = Just Noticeable
Difference.
and 23 (74%) added up attribute values in a linear fash-
ion. Of those 23 participants, 17 (74%) assigned weights
to the attributes according to their subjective importance
(e.g., participant 32). Finally, 22 of all 31 participants
(71%) combined the two types of strategy (e.g., partici-
pant 32).
2.3 Prediction accuracy
We calculated the degree to which the strategies de-
scribed by the participants could predict their own
choices. The averaged percentage of correct predictions
across all 30 trials was 73% (Figure 2, second bar).
Within the subset of the five cuing trials, the averaged pre-
diction accuracy was virtually the same (75%, first bar).
Note that these percentages are far greater than the 25%
that would be obtained when choosing randomly. This
indicates that the described strategies had reasonable pre-
dictive power.
Chance, however, may not be a good standard of com-
parison, because for a certain number of trials some mo-
bile phones may be favored over others independently of
the strategy used, especially when a phone dominated the
others on that trial. Thus, a high number of correct pre-
dictions does not necessarily imply that participants were
able to accurately describe their strategies. Therefore, we
determined, as another benchmark against which the 73%
correct predictions could be compared, the percentage of
correct predictions that resulted from using a certain par-
ticipant’s strategy to predict the choices of all other par-
ticipants. Across all participants, this resulted in 34%
correct predictions (Figure 2, third bar) — much closer to
chance level than to the percentage of correct predictions
that resulted when using the participants’ own strategies
to predict their choices. This result gives further evidence
for the uniqueness of the participants’ strategies and indi-
cates that they cannot be replaced easily by each other.
As a third benchmark, we determined the fit when
modeling the observed choices with two established
strategies from the literature.5 Specifically, we used six
variants of the Weighted ADDitive (WADD) strategy,
which is computationally demanding, and five variants
of the take-the-best heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein,
1996), a lexicographic strategy that applies one-reason
decision making and that is hence quite easy to execute
(see Figure 2). Each of the six variants of WADD cal-
culated a score for each alternative by adding up the
weighted values of each attribute and then choosing the
alternative with the highest overall score.6 The variants
differed with respect to the skewness of these weights.
At one extreme, we used EQual Weights (EQW). At
the other extreme, we used a set of noncompensatory
weights, that is, the weight of the attribute that was ranked
highest by a participant was bigger than the sum of the
weights of all the lower-ranked attributes, the weight of
5Because our main goal was to test whether IAPT provides valid
descriptions of strategies (rather than to model discrete choices with
sophisticated statistical tools such as conjoint analysis), we used bench-
mark strategies that could be formulated and executed without fitting
them to the participants’ choices.
6To be able to compare the values of the different attributes
to each other, we first standardized these values by performing z-
transformations and subsequently used these z values when multiply-
ing by the weights of the attributes. In addition, the attributes weight,
dimensions, and price were multiplied by –1, because lower values on
these attributes are generally perceived to be better.
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the attribute that was ranked second highest was big-
ger than the sum of all following weights, and so on
(WADD0).7
Take-the-best was originally formulated for inferential
tasks in which two alternatives had to be compared to
each other on a given criterion. Rieskamp and Hoffrage
(1999; 2008) generalized TTB from two-alternative to
multi-alternative choice tasks. For the preferential choice
task used in the present experiment, this heuristic works
as follows. It looks up the values on the most important
attribute (as specified by the participant) and chooses the
alternative with the best value. If two or more alterna-
tives have this best value, then take-the-best eliminates
all other alternatives from further consideration and com-
pares the remaining alternatives on the second most im-
portant attribute, and so on (for another way of generaliz-
ing TTB, see Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999). TTB is a fast
and frugal heuristic: it is easy to execute (once the cue or-
dering has been determined), and generally requires only
a small amount of information.
However, it does not seem psychologically plausible
to assume that information search is stopped in each and
every case in which alternatives differ on the most impor-
tant attribute. To capture an insight derived from early
research on psychophysics, we created versions of TTB
that operated with various Just-Noticeable-Differences
(JND). A JND is the difference between the attribute val-
ues on two alternatives that is sufficiently small to treat
the values as psychologically equal. We used five levels
of JNDs that we applied to all selected attributes, namely
0%, 5%, 10%, 20%, and 40%. The five corresponding
strategies are referred to as TTB0, TTB5, TTB10, TTB20
and TTB40, respectively. For calculating these JNDs, the
standard of reference was the alternative with the most
attractive attribute value (in the respective trial). For in-
stance, if the most important attribute of a particular par-
ticipant was price, and the cheapest phone in a given trial
cost 100 SFR, TTB20 would have eliminated all phones
that were more expensive than 120 SFR.
We predicted the 30 choices of each participant sepa-
rately using each of these variants of WADD and TTB.
The only difference in each strategy between partici-
pants was the ranking of the selected attributes, which
was determined by the participants’ responses in Phase
7Specifically, for this noncompensatory variant, the weight of a
given attribute was 1/2(r−1), where r is the rank of the selected at-
tribute in the attribute hierarchy established by the participant. The
other four variants (WADD4, WADD2, WADD1, and WADD0.5) were
obtained by adding a constant (4, 2, 1, or 0.5, respectively) to each
attribute weight in the noncompensatory set of weights. It is obvious
that adding nothing to the attribute weights in the noncompensatory
set of weights will maintain the noncompensatory structure, whereas
adding a constant will reduce the relative differences between the at-
tribute weights. As the constant approaches infinity, the relative differ-
ences approach zero, thereby ultimately turning the set of noncompen-
satory weights into a set of equal weights (i.e., EQW = WADD∞).
1. As can be seen in Figure 2, the fit of the variants
of WADD ranged between 55% and 57% correct pre-
dictions, suggesting that (consistent with Dawes, 1979)
different weighting schemes did not make a big differ-
ence (F (1, 44) < 1, p = .87.8) The fit of the variants
of TTB (averaged across all participants) ranged between
47% and 51%. Overall, the factor JND turned out to be
significant (F (2, 55) = 3.27, p = .049, MSe = 6.309). The
most important result, however, is that for each of these
established strategies the fit is much lower than for the de-
scribed strategies (all t’s (30) > 5.7, all p’s < .001).9 Even
when we selected the best fitting model for each partici-
pant, be it linear or lexicographic, the fit of the best-fitting
model (66%) was still lower than the fit achieved when
applying IAPT (t (30) = 2.85, p = .007).
2.3.1 Information search
Given that we used two different procedures (i.e., Mouse-
lab and retrospective verbal protocol), we can verify
whether the way in which participants searched for in-
formation is in agreement with the strategies they de-
scribed. We focused on three main questions. First, are
the described strategies reflected in the direction of the
participants’ search for information? Second, did they
stop acquiring further information for a specific alterna-
tive once this alternative should be eliminated according
to their described strategies? And third, does the fre-
quency with which they accessed information on the se-
lected attributes reflect the attributes’ ranking that they
had established in the first phase of the experiment?
Direction of information search. To examine the di-
rection of the participants’ information search we used
the Payne Index (PI, Payne, 1976), which indicates
whether the information search tends to proceed within or
across attributes (alternative-wise vs. attribute-wise). An
alternative-wise search pattern is associated with com-
pensatory strategies whereas attribute-wise search is in-
dicative of noncompensatory strategies. A score of 1.0
represents a fully alternative-based search whereas a
score of –1.0 represents a fully attribute-based search.
However, for asymmetrical matrices (i.e., when the num-
ber of attributes is not equal to the number of alterna-
tives), the expected PI score for a random information
search is not zero.10 Therefore, instead of taking zero
8The assumption of sphericity was violated, so the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was used in this analysis and the following analysis
concerning TTB.
9We obtained the same result when we measured contingency be-
tween IAPT’s predictions and observed choices using Goodman and
Kruskal’s (1954) λ.
10Another criticism is that the value of the PI varies as a function
of the number of transitions in a particular trial. Therefore, it can lead
to inaccurate conclusions and the values of the index observed under
different combinations of attributes and alternatives or even different
numbers of transitions are not directly comparable (Böckenholt & Hy-
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Figure 3: Mean percentage of accesses per attribute rank
in Experiment 1. The numbers in parentheses below an
attribute rank indicate how many participants used the
corresponding number of attributes or more.
as a reference point to distinguish alternative-wise from
attribute-wise search, we used the expected value of a
random search in a particular matrix. To obtain these
chance PIs, we first simulated 10,000 random sequences
of information search for each participant and each trial,
with the number of boxes opened by the simulation be-
ing equal to the number of boxes opened by the partici-
pant in the respective trial. We then calculated the PI for
each sequence and, finally, the mean of these PIs, which
served as the values for our chance PIs. It turned out that
participants’ chance PIs ranged between –0.03 and 0.62.
Twenty-two (71%) participants had an observed PI that
differed significantly from their chance PI and that indi-
cated an attribute-wise search, and 5 (16%) of the partic-
ipants had an observed PI that indicated an alternative-
wise search (the remaining 4 participants could not be
classified). This finding is in line with other process trac-
ing studies where it has been found that attribute-wise
search patterns prevail (Ford et al., 1989).
Two other search measures also indicate the use of
noncompensatory decision strategies: the depth and the
variability of search (Ford et al., 1989). Participants ac-
cessed on average 76% of the information (range: 47% to
100%, SD = 17%) and accessed equal amounts of infor-
mation on each alternative in only 35% of the trials.
Eliminations and information search. We also tested
whether the elimination of alternatives as described by
the participants’ strategies was reflected in their informa-
tion search. We assumed that, as soon as an alternative
was eliminated because its value on one of the attributes
failed to reach the threshold, the participant should not
have acquired any more information about that alterna-
tive. Indeed, participants stopped search on a particular
alternative after its elimination in one third (33%) of the
nan, 1994). Moreover, extreme PI values have a higher probability of
occurrence than do intermediate values (see also Footnote 17).
trials. However, in the remaining two thirds (67%) at least
one piece of information was acquired on an alternative
even though it was already doomed to elimination.
Frequency of access. To test whether there is a relation
between an attribute’s rank and the frequency with which
information about this attribute was accessed, we tested
whether information about attributes that were reported to
be more important was acquired more frequently than in-
formation about less important attributes. Generally, we
found that the more important an attribute was rated on
average, the more often it was accessed by the partici-
pants (see Figure 3).11 However, it should be noted that
attribute importance was confounded with the vertical po-
sition on the screen, which may have artificially enhanced
this effect.
2.4 Discussion
Our main finding is that people facing a consumer choice
situation are able to verbally formalize the strategy they
used to make their decisions. The strategies identified
with our method correctly predicted the observed choices
in 73% of the cases, which is far greater than chance.
Moreover, the identified strategies were able to predict
the actual choices much better than several variants of
linear and lexicographic strategies. Thus, our findings do
not lend support to Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) claim that
people’s ability to observe and report upon higher order
mental operations is underdeveloped — if existent at all.
On the other hand, in 27% of the cases the decisions made
by the described strategies did not correspond to the ac-
tual choices.
One simple reason for these prediction errors could be
that at least some participants changed their strategy (in-
cluding parameters of their strategy such as elimination
thresholds) while proceeding through the choice phase.
Such changes over time could not be considered in the
analysis because in Phase 3 the participants were asked
to formalize only one strategy. Although this explana-
tion might potentially account for some misclassifica-
tions, the interviews did not provide much evidence for
11To determine whether the number of accesses per rank was signifi-
cantly different from each other, we conducted a within-participant one-
way ANOVA with attribute rank as an independent variable. We used
only the first four ranks for the analysis because this was the minimum
number of attributes selected by all individual participants. The linear
trend was highly significant (F (1, 30) = 18.9, p = .001). We then
calculated the correlation between attribute rank and frequency of ac-
cess separately for each participant, standardized these correlations by
means of a Fisher transformation and calculated the mean over all par-
ticipants. This standardized mean was re-transformed and resulted in a
correlation of –0.83. Moreover, we calculated the correlation between
(1) each participant’s correlation between attribute rank and frequency
of access and (2) the number of attributes this participant accessed. This
correlation was .025, indicating that participants who used only a small
number of attributes did not spuriously inflate the former correlation.
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such changes over time. Moreover, there was virtually no
difference in the prediction accuracy between the first and
the second half of the trials (72.5% and 73.6%, respec-
tively; t (30) = –0.43, p = .67), which does not support
the hypothesis that their strategies differed over time.
Another reason for the wrong predictions could be ex-
ecution errors and unreliable choices. From the litera-
ture on bootstrapping, for instance, it is well known that
laypeople and experts are often unable to execute a strat-
egy reliably and without errors. This is also the major
explanation why, in almost all studies on this issue, linear
models outperform the people on whom these models are
based (for a review, see Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989).
Moreover, in the second experiment we describe below,
participants repeated half of the trials but made identical
choices in both trials in only 73% of the cases. Future re-
search could both check for participants’ re-test reliabil-
ity (see Experiment 2) and also confront them with those
cases in which the strategy they had formulated in Phase
3 deviated from their own previous choices. It would be
interesting to know whether they would change the for-
mulation of the strategy or whether they would prefer to
choose differently.
Finally, the mismatch between described strategies and
observed processes could be due to the fact that the par-
ticipants’ strategy description resulted from an inductive
inference, that is, from an attempt to characterize the
conditions under which a specific alternative is chosen.
This description should not be confused with the strategy
the participants used when making the choices — maybe
such strategies did not even exist in the first place and the
descriptions were just constructed post-hoc, after the ex-
perimenter asked the participants to do so. Likewise, we
cannot exclude the possibility that participants used con-
figural strategies (Garcia-Retamero, Hoffrage, & Dieck-
mann, 2007) in Phase 2 but did not report this in Phase 3
as such strategies are complex and thus hard to describe.
2.4.1 Information search vs. described strategies
Many of the described strategies are in line with previ-
ous research stating that people often start with a non-
compensatory strategy to reduce the number of alterna-
tives in the choice set, and then switch to a compensatory
strategy to make a decision between the remaining op-
tions (Billings & Marcus, 1983; Ford et al., 1989; Payne,
1976; see, however, Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). Such
two-step strategies pose a challenge for any attempt to
contrast the described strategies and the choices they pre-
dict with the information acquisition data. And in fact,
our findings are mixed.
First, the information search measures generally indi-
cated that participants engaged in more noncompensatory
search, which is consistent with the finding that most of
the described strategies contained noncompensatory el-
ements. However, beyond such indication for noncom-
pensatory processing, no correspondence could be found
between the described strategies and other information
search measures (depth and variability of search). Sec-
ond, participants’ search for information reflects, by and
large, their ranking of the attributes. Third, however, par-
ticipants very frequently (i.e., in 66% of the trials) looked
up information for alternatives that they should have al-
ready eliminated according to the strategy they described.
Given that the protocol and information search data
converge only to a certain degree, the question arises as
to what extent a given strategy actually directs the search
for information, and, ultimately, how valid and specific
the conclusions are that can be drawn from information
search data (for a critique on information search tech-
niques see Bröder, 2000). A possible explanation for the
discrepancy between people’s actual search behavior and
the search behavior that is expected given their strategies
is that the acquisition of information serves the purpose
of giving a general overview of the choice options rather
than providing only the information that is needed for the
execution of a decision strategy. It may be that the partic-
ular strategy is generated and executed only after having
obtained a certain amount of information. Considering
the fact that strategy choice is often adaptive (cf. Payne et
al., 1993; Bröder & Newell, 2008), it is reasonable to as-
sume that a decision maker first acquires a certain amount
of information and then decides on a strategy (or just cer-
tain parameters of it such as thresholds).
Overall, the first test of IAPT yielded reasonably satis-
factory results. In Experiment 2, we sought to further de-
velop and eventually improve it by integrating eye track-
ing technology.
3 Experiment 2
One of the fastest and most natural ways for humans and
many other species to acquire information about some-
thing is to simply look at it. Eye movements are very
fast, accurate, and, due to their spontaneity, they cannot
easily be censored by the participants. Consequently, the
recording of eye movements is expected to yield very re-
liable and complete data about information search. The
researchers’ optimism concerning this technology is re-
flected in a large number of studies that used eye tracking
in a variety of disciplines, such as neuroscience, psychol-
ogy, and marketing, to name just a few (see Duchowski,
2002, Rayner, 1998, and Wedel & Pieters, 2007 for re-
views). Of interest for our purposes is that the infor-
mation about the choice alternatives can be presented in
virtually the same matrix as in the Mouselab setup (with
its cells uncovered), which makes direct comparisons be-
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tween the two methods feasible. Despite the evident sim-
ilarity between these two information search techniques
and the possible advantages of eye tracking (see Table
1), very few studies directly compared them. In a study
by van Raaij (1977), 20 housewives chose among thir-
teen alternative brands of coffee, each described on four
attributes. In a first session, they examined actual prod-
uct packages and their eye movements were recorded.
Four months later, the same participants now made their
choices using an information board. Although choices
were faster with eye tracking, participants acquired more
information in this condition (more than half of the avail-
able information) than in the information board condition
(about a third of the available information). More than
half of the searched information was accessed twice or
more with eye tracking, but no reacquisitions were ob-
served in the information board condition.
Lohse and Johnson (1996) compared Mouselab with
eye tracking using apartment selection tasks and gambles.
As predicted, they found meaningful differences between
the two methods. With eye tracking, participants were
faster, had more fixations, and more reacquisitions but ex-
amined a smaller percentage of the total information and
their information search showed a more variable pattern.
Moreover, participants tended to search more attribute-
wise with eye tracking than with Mouselab. The authors
concluded that the recording of eye movements has sev-
eral advantages: it is faster and less demanding for the
participants, it leads to more accurate task performance
in choices between gambles (especially when processing
demands are increased), and it is better suited for larger
problems (i.e., more alternatives and/or attributes). Sim-
ilarly, in his comparison of several process tracing meth-
ods Russo (1978) also came to the conclusion that eye
tracking has advantages not offered by other methods.
Moreover, he argues for a simultaneous use of eye track-
ing and verbal protocols.
Bearing on these results, in Experiment 2 we used eye
tracking in addition to Mouselab within IAPT to test for
possible influences of the research method on the partic-
ipants’ cognitive processes and behavior, and, ultimately,
whether the use of eye tracking increased the proportion
of observed choices that were correctly predicted by the
strategies revealed by our method. A higher percentage
of correct predictions and a higher convergence between
the described strategies and the information search data
would be indicative of such an improvement. A further,
minor point of interest in Experiment 2 was the phe-
nomenon of choice deferral, that is, the decision not to
select any of the presented options. As opposed to the
forced choice paradigm used in most of the studies on
preferential choice (and also in our first experiment), we
explicitly wanted to give our participants the possibility
to defer choice in any given set. We think that this is es-
sential for the type of choice situation examined in our
experiments because in real life, people frequently (e.g.,
more than 95% of the time, Sismeiro & Bucklin, 2004)
decide not to buy any of the options available in a certain
(online) store.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
Participants were 27 students (5 female and 22 male) of
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology of Lausanne
(EPFL) and the University of Lausanne with a mean age
of 24.6 years (SD = 3).
3.1.2 Task and stimuli
As in Experiment 1, the task was to select a mobile phone
for purchase out of a set of four. The four phones pre-
sented in each trial were drawn randomly12 from the pool
of phones used in the first experiment (except for one
which disappeared from the market in the meantime).
3.1.3 Apparatus
For Phases 1 and 2 of IAPT we used a computer-based
process tracing measure very similar to the one in Ex-
periment 1. It was synchronized with the eye tracker so
that stimuli presentation in both conditions could be done
with the same program.
We used the iView X™Hi-Speed eye tracker, manufac-
tured by SensoMotoric Instruments (SMI; Teltow, Ger-
many), which works at a sampling rate of 1250 Hz, a
spatial resolution of 0.01° and a gaze position accuracy
of 0.25°. Only one eye was recorded and the gaze posi-
tion was determined using the pupil and corneal reflec-
tion method. The system has a chin rest to avoid head
movements. We used a 17-inch screen for stimulus pre-
sentation and the distance between the participants’ eyes
and the screen was about 50 cm. The illumination of the
screen was kept constant and room lighting did not inter-
fere with the recording capabilities of the eye tracker.
3.1.4 Design and procedure
Each participant experienced both of the two conditions,
Mouselab (ML) and eye tracking (ET) (in Phase 2 of
12This random process had the following constraints: (a) Any set
of four phones consisted of four distinct phones, that is, no phone ap-
peared more than once in a given set. (b) Half of the trials (randomly
determined) used the same phones in both conditions, but in a different,
random order. Here, we excluded the order that was the exact reverse of
the original order as well as all the orders where two phones were next
to each other in the same order as in the first condition. In addition,
the first trial of the first condition was never repeated and the last trial
of the first condition was never repeated as the first trial in the second
condition.
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IAPT), with the order counterbalanced (13 participants
began with ML and 14 with ET). Each condition con-
sisted of 12 trials. Half of the trials of the first condition
were repeated in the second condition, but with a differ-
ent, random ordering of the alternatives (see Footnote 11
for details). Participants completed the first two phases
in approximately 30 minutes and the last one in approxi-
mately 25 minutes. In addition, between five and ten min-
utes were needed for the calibration of the eye tracker.
Except for the changes related to the new research
questions and some minor modifications, the general pro-
cedure was identical to the one of the first experiment.
The changes were as follows. First, because there were
no differences between the with-list condition and the
without-list condition in Experiment 1, the list of at-
tributes was now shown to all participants. Second, given
that many participants in Experiment 1 requested infor-
mation about phone brand and name we now replaced the
image of the phone with this information. Third, to open
a cell it was sufficient to move the mouse over it (instead
of clicking as in Experiment 1). The cell closed again
when the mouse was moved away. This modification was
necessary to be able to compare the data from Mouselab
and eye tracking. Fourth, we increased the size of the
cells so that in Phase 2 participants could not read the in-
formation contained in the cells neighboring the fixated
cell. Due to size limitations of the screen, the maximum
number of attributes that could be selected was ten. The
cell size was kept constant irrespective of the number of
selected attributes, with each cell being 60 mm wide and
33 mm high (visual angles of 6.8° and 3.8°, respectively).
Because our aim was to keep the situation as natural and
realistic as possible, we informed the participants about
this limit only when the number of attributes they selected
exceeded this number. Apart from the fact that the cells
were initially covered in the Mouselab condition, the in-
terface was completely identical in both conditions. Fifth,
in Phase 2 participants were now given the possibility to
choose none of the four alternatives. To defer choice,
participants had to click a button labeled “Choose none
of these.” After that, they had to indicate why they de-
ferred by selecting one of two reasons: “Because none of
them is good enough” or “Because I am not sure which
is the best.” There was no cost to deferring choice, and
participants could do so as often as they wished. Sixth
and finally, instead of presenting screen-shots of the in-
formation board (i.e., cuing trials), in Phase 3 we tried
to enhance recall by letting the participants repeat one of
the trials of the first condition of Phase 2. This repeated
trial was randomly selected from the set of 12 (with the
exception of the first trial). After that, participants were
presented with an empty matrix so that the values shown
in the repeated trial did not influence the participant when
describing his or her strategy.
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Figure 4: Percentage of choices correctly predicted by
the participants’ decision strategies in Experiment 2. The
vertical bars denote standard errors.
3.1.5 Payment
In the introduction to Phase 3, participants were informed
that they will receive 1.50 Swiss Francs (1 SFR = approx-
imately 0.82 USD at the time the study was conducted)
for each correct prediction of their described strategy,
with a minimum guaranteed payment of 10 SFR. The av-
erage payment was 25 SFR (SD = 6).
3.2 Results
On average, participants selected 22% of the available at-
tributes. The attributes that were determined most often
were price (96%), size (85%), stand-by time (59%), and
digital camera (56%) (further details available from the
authors upon request). All analyses regarding differences
between the conditions were done using a mixed design
ANOVA including the within-participant variable of con-
dition and the between-participants variable of order.
3.2.1 Deferrals
In 31% of the trials of the ML condition and in 30% of
the trials of the ET condition, participants did not choose
any of the phones presented. This is in line with most of
the literature on choice deferral (e.g., Dhar, 1997; White
& Hoffrage, in press). The deferral option was used by
all but two participants (93%). For most of the deferrals
(86%, across conditions) participants indicated that none
of the available options was good enough and for 14%
they indicated that they were not sure which option was
best.
3.2.2 Described strategies
Again, we found the two general types of strategies: elim-
ination and additive. Of the 27 participants, almost all (26
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of 27; 96%) eliminated alternatives during their decision
making process, based on between one and nine (M =
4.77, Mdn = 5) attributes. Eight participants used JNDs.
Adding up attribute values in a linear fashion was used
by 18 of 27 (67%) participants. Of those 18 participants
who used an additive strategy, 10 (63%) assigned weights
to the attributes according to their subjective importance.
Finally, 17 of the 27 participants (63%) combined elimi-
nation with an additive strategy.
3.2.3 Prediction accuracy
The degree to which the strategies described by the
participants could predict their own choices (66%) was
slightly, but not significantly, higher (F (1, 25) = 3.96, p
= .07, MSe = 139.8) in the ML condition (69%) than in
the ET condition (63%). In the repeated trials, partici-
pants made the same decision in both instances in only
73% of the cases. Note that the prediction accuracy was
considerably higher in the consistent trials (78%) than in
the inconsistent trials (40%) (F (1, 22) = 52.3, p < .001,
MSe = 296.3). Moreover, the prediction accuracy was
significantly higher in the trials where the participants se-
lected an option (70%) than in the trials in which choice
was deferred (53%, F (1, 18) = 4.81, p = .042, MSe =
812.7).13
3.2.4 Information search
We did an in-depth analysis of the information search
data to check for possible differences between ML and
ET. As in the first experiment, we also verified whether
the described strategies were reflected in the information
search data. In particular, we focused on the following:
(1) the time spent per trial, (2) the amount of information
acquired, (3) the information considered by the partici-
pants compared to the information needed by the strat-
egy they described, (4) the direction of the information
search, and (5) the correlation between percentage of ac-
cesses and attribute rank. The scanpaths depicted in Fig-
ure 5 exemplify some of the results described in the fol-
lowing.
Due to some calibration problems that we detected
only when analyzing the ET data, seven participants had
to be excluded from all analyses involving information
search data except for time. Half of the remaining 20
participants started with Mouselab. The ET data was an-
alyzed using the software BeGaze (SMI). We analyzed
fixation position, duration, and sequence (i.e., scanpath).
Fixations of less than 100 ms were excluded from the
analysis.14
13For all analyses concerning choices and deferrals, the one partici-
pant who never chose and the six participants who did not defer at least
once in each condition were excluded.
1412BeGaze calculates fixations by subtracting saccades and eye
Figure 5: The scanpath of one participant in the ML con-
dition (a) and in the ET condition (b) of Experiment 2.
The size of the circles correspond to the time a box re-
mained open in the ML condition and the fixation time in
the ET condition. The trials were identical in both con-
ditions with the exception that the positions of Phones 1
and 4 were swapped. The participant completed the trials
in 44 sec (ML) and 17 sec (ET).
Time. In general, participants spent significantly more
time per trial in the ML condition than in the ET condition
(36.73 vs. 20.41 seconds, respectively, F (1, 25) = 72.0, p
< .001, MSe = 52.36). There was a significant interaction
between condition and order (F (1, 25) = 30.5, p < .001,
MSe = 52.36), but in both orderings the effect of condition
was significant and in the same direction.
The time in which a trial was completed did not de-
blinks from the original gaze stream. For a saccade to be detected, three
conditions had to be satisfied: (a) peak values of velocities in the gaze
stream were greater than 75°, (b) the single peak value of velocity lay
in the middle 60% between the start and end of the event and (c) the
duration of the event was more than 1 ms. An eye blink was detected
when the conditions for saccades were satisfied and when the change in
the pupil diameter exceeded an internally defined threshold.
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pend on whether a phone was chosen or choice was de-
ferred (29.47 vs, 29.49 seconds, respectively; F (1, 22)
< 1, p = .95). However, participants needed significantly
more time when they indicated that they were not sure
which option was best as compared to those trials for
which they indicated that none of the options was good
enough (39.82 vs. 26.54 seconds, respectively, F (1, 7) =
13.1, p = .009, MSe = 51.39).15
Amount of information. Our next analysis concerns the
amount of information the participants accessed. First,
we distinguished between the total number of accesses
or fixations (i.e., including reacquisitions of the same in-
formation) and the number of different cells accessed.
As expected, participants had significantly more total ac-
cesses in the ET condition than in the ML condition
(41.83 vs. 22.35, respectively, F (1, 18) = 44.5, p < .001,
MSe = 85.35). The effect of condition interacted with the
order (F (1, 18) = 14.7, p < .001); looking at the simple
effects of condition for each order showed that this was
the case for both orderings but the effect just failed to
reach significance when ML was the first condition (ML
first: F (1, 18) = 4.00, p = .06; ET first: F (1, 18) =
55.2, p < .001). However, the number of different cells
accessed was very similar in the two conditions. On av-
erage, participants accessed 15.45 (59%) cells in the ML
condition and 16.73 (63%) cells in the ET condition (F
(1, 18) = 3.01, p = .01, MSe = 5.393). Again, the ef-
fect of condition interacted with the order (F (1, 18) =
15.0, p < .001). When ET was the first condition, partic-
ipants searched for significantly more information in the
ET condition than in the ML condition (F (1, 18) = 15.7,
p < .001). However, this was reversed for the opposite
ordering, but here the difference between the ML and ET
condition was not significant (F (1, 18) = 2.28, p = .15).
Second, we looked at the reacquisition rate, which is
the percentage of accesses that were reaccesses of previ-
ously seen information (in the same trial). There was a
significant difference between the two conditions, with a
reacquisition rate of 27% in the ML condition and 57%
in the ET condition (F (1, 18) = 126, p < .001, MSe =
72.34). Again, the effect of condition interacted with the
order (F (1, 18) = 13.1, p = .002), but in both orderings
the effect was significant and in the same direction.
Information considered. Again, we compared the in-
formation accessed by the participants with the informa-
tion that their described strategies needed for execution.
Regardless of the condition, participants accessed about
50% more information than prescribed by their strategy.
Interestingly, out of all the information that was needed
by the strategy, only about 18% was not accessed.
Direction and variability of information search. As al-
ready mentioned in the first experiment, the PI has been
15Only the 9 participants who indicated that they deferred for both
reasons (on different trials) were used for this analysis.
subject to some criticism (Böckenholt & Hynan, 1994;
Stokmans, 1992). As a reaction, Böckenholt and Hynan
(1994) developed a standardized version of the PI, the SM
index.16 We calculated the SM index for each participant
and each condition and found the following. In the ML
condition, 17 of 20 (85%) participants had a SM score
that indicated attribute-wise search whereas only one par-
ticipant had a SM score that indicated alternative-wise
search. Two participants had non-significant SM scores.
In the ET condition, 14 participants searched attribute-
wise and again only one participant (not the one of the
ML condition) searched alternative-wise. In this con-
dition, five participants had non-significant SM scores.
There was no significant difference in the SM scores be-
tween the two conditions (F (1, 18) < 1, p = .39).
In only 14 (6%) of all trials of the ML condition (across
all participants) and in none of the trials of the ET con-
dition did the participants access an equal proportion
of information about each alternative (cf. variability of
search). This high degree of selectiveness was more pro-
nounced in the ET condition than in the ML condition
(F(1,18) = 34.8, p < .001, MSe = 2.579).
Frequency of access. As in Experiment 1, we com-
pared the frequency of access with the attribute ranks as-
signed by the participants. There were no significant dif-
ferences between the two conditions (F (1, 19) < 1, p =
.71) and the correlation (r = −0.91) very closely resem-
bled that found in Experiment 1 (r = −0.83). Interest-
ingly, the time participants spent on a particular piece of
information did not depend on the importance they as-
signed to the attribute containing this information (F (3,
54) < 1, p = .90 and p = .88 for the ML and ET condition,
respectively).17
Summary. The analysis of the process data yielded
the following results. First, participants needed signifi-
cantly less time to complete a trial in the ET condition
than in the ML condition. When participants deferred
choice, they spent more time on a trial when they re-
ported deferring because none of the phones was good
enough than when they reported that they were unsure
which phone was best. Second, participants had a sig-
nificantly higher number of accesses (including reacqui-
sitions) in the ET condition than in the ML condition.
16This index is a function of the differences between the observed
alternative-wise and attribute-wise transitions. For any N, the mean is
0 and the variance is 1 when the search pattern is random. For a large
number of transitions, the SM approximates a standard normal distribu-
tion, that is, unlike for the PI, extreme values have a lower probability
of occurrence than intermediate values. The SM index is not without
criticism either (e.g., Ball, 1997; Harte & Koele, 2001), but we felt that
it is sufficiently informative for our purposes. Note that it is applicable
only for matrices where the cells do not remain open once they have
been clicked on and could thus not have been used for Experiment 1.
17This analysis was calculated based on only the first four ranks
(thereby excluding one participant who selected less than four at-
tributes).
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However, there was no difference between the two con-
ditions regarding the number of different cells accessed
(i.e., depth of search). Consequentially, the reacquisition
rate was far higher in the ET condition than in the ML
condition. Third, when comparing information search
and the described strategies we found that participants ac-
cessed significantly more information than their strategy
required for execution, without any difference between
the conditions. However, they obtained almost all the
necessary information for their strategy to work. Fourth,
the pattern of search also did not differ significantly be-
tween the two conditions. The search was generally more
attribute-wise and selective (indicating noncompensatory
processing), which was in line with the nature of the de-
scribed strategies. However, the participants’ search was
significantly more selective in the ET condition than in
the ML condition. Fifth and finally, participants’ search
for information reflected, by and large, their ranking of
the attributes according to their importance.
3.3 Discussion of Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we successfully replicated our find-
ing that the strategies identified with IAPT have good
predictive power. In 66% of the cases, the described
strategies correctly predicted the participants’ choices,
which is very similar to the 73% we observed in Exper-
iment 1. Moreover, it appears that many of the incor-
rect predictions can be attributed to inconsistent choices
rather than to unreliable strategy descriptions: partici-
pants made consistent choices in only 73% of the tri-
als and the prediction accuracy was considerably higher
(i.e.,78%) when only the consistent trials were taken into
account. Thus, it appears that some or even many of the
incorrect predictions of the participants’ strategies can
be explained by inconsistent behavior during the choice
phase.
Very similar to what we found in the first experiment,
the described strategies were only partly reflected in the
information search data. The analysis of the pattern, vari-
ability and depth of search measures did not lead to new
insights, and, in an analysis slightly different to the one
performed in the first experiment, we found that partici-
pants accessed a lot of information that was not needed by
the described strategy. However, they rarely failed to ob-
tain information that was required by their strategy, which
demonstrates at least some convergence between the in-
formation search measures and the verbal protocol.
Regarding choice deferral, the participants’ strategies
were far less successful at predicting choice deferrals
(i.e., 53%) than the choice of a concrete alternative (i.e.,
70%). It seems that participants were better at giving rea-
sons for their choices than for their deferrals.
The comparison between the two information search
techniques, Mouselab and eye tracking, yielded the fol-
lowing picture. Eye tracking was generally faster, that
is, even though participants had a higher number of ac-
cesses, they needed less time to complete a trial. Fur-
thermore, the information search was more selective (i.e.,
there was a higher variability of search) in the eye track-
ing condition. However, participants searched for virtu-
ally the same proportion of the total information in both
conditions, and the difference in the number of accesses
can almost completely be attributed to the fact that partic-
ipants simply reaccessed some cells several times. Many
of these reaccesses might have served the purpose of val-
idating a tentative choice (which was often visible in the
scanpath of the participants’ eye movements), which cor-
responds to the validation stage reported by Russo and
Leclerc (1994). Moreover, the pattern of search and the
relation of attribute rank and frequency of access did not
differ between the Mouselab and the eye tracking condi-
tion. Our results are quite similar to the findings of van
Raaij (1977) and Lohse and Johnson (1996) except for
the following: van Raaij’s participants acquired more dif-
ferent items with eye tracking than with the information
board, whereas our participants had a very similar depth
of search in both conditions. Lohse and Johnson found a
slight difference in search pattern (i.e., more alternative-
wise search with eye tracking than with Mouselab) and
their participants unexpectedly searched for less informa-
tion with eye tracking. In contrast, we did not find any
differences on these variables.
What can we now conclude about the use of eye track-
ing with IAPT? It appears that this methodology im-
proves neither the exactness of the description of the cog-
nitive processes nor the quality of the results concerning
the information search. Although this method allows for
a more natural way of searching for information, it does
not provide more informative data than does Mouselab.
With eye tracking, there is considerable noise in the in-
formation search data due to the fact that sometimes it is
impossible to separate voluntary information acquisitions
from random fixations that occurred while the participant
was thinking. With Mouselab, the process of information
acquisition seems to be more systematic, which could be
a result of some reactivity of the method on the one hand
(see Glöckner & Betsch, 2008), but which leads to data
that is easier to interpret on the other hand. In sum, de-
spite the technological innovations of the eye tracking
technology, Mouselab is still much easier to set up and
to use. Mouselab requires no calibration and works with
virtually every participant, whereas eye tracking requires
exclusion of some of the participants because no reliable
calibration can be achieved. (In our experiment, this was
the case for seven of the 27 participants; 26%.) In addi-
tion, with Mouselab, many participants can be run at the
same time and even over the internet with a ready-to-use
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program called MouselabWEB (Willemsen & Johnson,
2006). Given that the advantages of eye tracking were
not very pronounced in our experiment, we conclude that
Mouselab is the more convenient and efficient method for
this kind of task.
4 General discussion and conclu-
sions
In two experiments we have shown that our new interac-
tive process tracing method is a valid technique for iden-
tifying human decision processes. We were able to repli-
cate various findings in the related literature and achieved
a detailed description of the strategies people used when
making a purchase decision. Similar to Bettman (1970),
Larcker and Lessig (1983), Einhorn et al. (1979), and Li
et al. (2000), we showed that models constructed based
on verbal reports describe the participants’ behavior quite
well.
A more critical finding that we observed in both exper-
iments is that people’s search for information often de-
viated from what would be expected given the described
strategy.18 Moreover, it appears that the data obtained
with Mouselab and eye tracking are on a rather general
level and, consequently, are not specific enough to allow
for discrimination among candidate decision strategies.
This casts some doubt on the general usefulness of in-
formation search techniques, at least in this context. It
may even be that the link between information search and
cognitive processes is less pronounced than commonly
assumed.19 Thus, we believe that it is sensible to use ver-
18It should be noted that this is certainly not the first study that re-
vealed a mismatch between the process that is expected from the iden-
tified strategy and the process that is actually observed. Rieskamp and
Hoffrage (2008), for instance, found that participants who were clas-
sified as selecting a weighted additive strategy did not search for in-
formation alternative-wise as one would expect from the description of
their strategies but instead searched for information attribute-wise. Fol-
lowing Tversky (1969), these authors speculated that participants, when
applying a WADD strategy, did not compute a score for each alterna-
tive sequentially but instead computed several scores in parallel, one for
each alternative, by looking up information attribute-wise and by using
the information of each additional attribute to update the scores. This
procedure appears cognitively more demanding, because all scores have
to be maintained in memory. However, it has the advantage that at any
point during the evaluation, all alternatives are comparable on a sub-
set of attributes, so that when making inferences under time pressure,
a decision can be made on the basis of the preliminary scores. Like-
wise, Rieskamp and Otto (2006) also found that participants searched
attribute-wise, even though their inferences could best be predicted by
WADD. Finally, Johnson, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and Willemsen (2008)
found a mismatch between the search order prescribed by the priority
heuristic (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006) and their partici-
pants’ information search as observed with Mouselab.
19A possible reason for this is that Mouselab alters the way infor-
mation is searched and processed. For instance, Glöckner and Betsch
(2008) found that under time pressure, participants switched from com-
pensatory to non-compensatory processing only when Mouselab was
bal protocols in addition to the search measures to obtain
data from two different sources that, it seems, highlight
two qualitatively different aspects of the decision making
process. For IAPT this means that in particular Phases 1
and 3 are crucial for the detection of cognitive decision
processes. However, we nevertheless think that the use of
information search techniques is still worthwhile when
integrated into a multimethod approach such as IAPT,
where the data of one method can be validated with the
data of the other.
In conclusion, our findings demonstrate that IAPT is
a useful tool for the description of decision processes.
In the future, this method could be used in other do-
mains and with different participant populations to learn
more about domain specificity and inter-individual dif-
ferences in this context. Moreover, in addition to the
purely descriptive use of IAPT, we can also imagine it
being used for applied purposes. For instance, the IAPT
technique could prove beneficial for the creation of pur-
chase environments, especially regarding the presentation
of product information (e.g., selection and positioning of
attributes presented to consumers). Another possibility
would be to use the obtained findings for the development
of decision support systems, such as interactive choice
aids that can be implemented in consumer websites (e.g.,
Edwards & Fasolo, 2001; Häubl & Trifts, 2000). These
choice aids facilitate the process of choosing by directly
assisting the consumers in the execution of typical deci-
sion strategies (e.g., by providing tools for quickly elim-
inating alternatives or calculating overall values). Thus,
IAPT does not only provide valid descriptions of decision
strategies, it also has rich potential for applications.
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